Reproductive autonomy, the non-identity problem, and the non-person problem

Area of Science:

• Ethics
• Philosophy of Mind
• Bioethics

Background:

• The Non-Identity Problem addresses the ethical dilemma of decisions impacting future individuals who would not otherwise exist.
• Existing approaches often focus on 'wronging' rather than 'harming' offspring in reproductive contexts.
• A related 'Non-Person Problem' arises if only persons can be wronged, yet 'person-making properties' allow for human non-persons.

Purpose of the Study:

• To address the Non-Person Problem within discussions of the Non-Identity Problem.
• To reconcile the intuition that certain human organisms can be wronged even if they never attain personhood.
• To propose a refined concept of personhood that resolves these ethical challenges.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis of ethical concepts, including 'wronging,' 'harming,' and 'personhood.'
• Examination of the implications of 'person-making properties' for identifying potential victims of ethical transgressions.
• Development of a revised definition of 'person' to encompass higher-order capacities.

Main Results:

• Views that only persons can be wronged face counter-intuitive consequences when applied to human organisms denied personhood.
• Decisions preventing an organism from developing person-making properties can indeed wrong that organism.
• A revised concept of personhood, including higher-order capacities, offers a robust solution.

Conclusions:

• Solutions to the Non-Identity Problem focusing on wronging must adequately address the Non-Person Problem.
• Redefining 'person' to include higher-order capacities is crucial for a comprehensive ethical framework.
• This refined understanding of personhood better accounts for the moral status of developing human organisms.