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Co-operation and defection: playing the field and the ESS
1Department of Statistics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.
Journal of Theoretical Biology
|July 21, 1991
Summary
This study analyzes foraging flock dilemmas using game theory. A "non-degenerating" model shows that cooperation can lead to a stable mixed strategy, preventing defectors from exploiting the group.
Area of Science:
- Behavioral Ecology
- Evolutionary Game Theory
- Game Theory
Background:
- Patchily dispersed food resources present a dilemma for foraging individuals.
- Individuals must choose between cooperating in food searches or defecting and relying on others.
Purpose of the Study:
- To analyze the synergistic n-player game of cooperation vs. defection in foraging flocks.
- To determine conditions for a mixed Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS).
- To assess the evolutionary stability of mixed strategies against pure strategists, especially defectors.
Main Methods:
- Analysis of a synergistic n-player game model.
- Derivation of conditions for a mixed ESS.
- Examination of mixed strategy stability against invasions by pure strategists and recognizable defectors.
Main Results:
- In "degenerating" models, recognizable defectors can invade and spread.
- In "non-degenerating" models, a mixed ESS can be achieved that is immune to defector invasions.
Conclusions:
- Cooperation in foraging can be evolutionarily stable under specific game conditions.
- The structure of the game model is crucial for determining the success of cooperative strategies against exploitation.