Mutual trust and cooperation in the evolutionary hawks-doves game

Area of Science:

• Social network analysis
• Evolutionary game theory
• Computational social science

Background:

• The hawks-doves game traditionally predicts a persistent fraction of defectors in large, well-mixed populations.
• Understanding the conditions that promote cooperation in social dilemmas is crucial for societal well-being.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate cooperation dynamics in the hawks-doves game using a novel weighted dynamical network model.
• To determine if cooperation can become the norm under conditions of flexible social ties.

Main Methods:

• Development of a new dynamical network model incorporating mutual satisfaction in pairwise interactions.
• Simulation of the hawks-doves game on evolving networks where individuals can sever ties and form new connections.
• Analysis of network structures and the factors enabling cooperator success.

Main Results:

• Cooperation emerges as the dominant strategy when individuals can strategically change undesirable neighbors.
• Cooperative behavior demonstrates robustness against significant perturbations in strategies.
• The study identifies key network structures and mechanisms that facilitate the prevalence of cooperators.

Conclusions:

• Flexible social ties and network adaptability can overcome the limitations of traditional game theory predictions.
• Cooperation can be a stable and thriving norm in social systems, challenging the inevitability of defection.
• This research provides an encouraging perspective on the potential for widespread cooperation in human societies.