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06:18
The Collective Trust Game: An Online Group Adaptation of the Trust Game Based on the HoneyComb Paradigm
Published on: October 20, 2022
Cooperators benefit through reputation-based partner choice in economic games
Karolina Sylwester1, Gilbert Roberts
1Centre for Behaviour and Evolution, Institute of Neuroscience, Newcastle University, Henry Wellcome Building, Framlington Place, Newcastle-upon-Tyne NE2 4HH, UK. karolina.sylwester@ncl.ac.uk
Biology Letters
|April 23, 2010
Summary
Investing in a cooperative reputation can lead to net benefits by improving partner selection. Competitive altruism (CA) explains unconditional cooperation through reputation-based partner choice, offering an alternative to indirect reciprocity.
Area of Science:
- Social Psychology
- Behavioral Economics
- Game Theory
Background:
- Unconditional cooperation, like charitable donations, remains difficult to explain.
- Competitive altruism (CA) suggests cooperation builds reputation for profitable partnerships.
Purpose of the Study:
- To investigate if investing in a cooperative reputation yields net benefits through partner access.
- To test the role of competitive altruism in explaining unconditional cooperation.
Main Methods:
- Participants engaged in a public goods game (PGG).
- Following the PGG, participants chose partners for a second cooperative game.
- Payoffs were analyzed based on cooperation levels and partner selection.
Main Results:
- Higher PGG contributions led to increased selection as preferred partners.
- Individuals selected by more cooperative partners received higher payoffs.
- Reputational competition intensified with higher potential partner choice payoffs.
Conclusions:
- Investing in reputation through cooperation provides net benefits via access to better partners.
- Competitive altruism offers a viable explanation for unconditional cooperation and reputation-building behavior.
- CA provides an alternative to indirect reciprocity, explaining cooperation even without prior reputation tracking.
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