Norms inform mental state ascriptions: A rational explanation for the side-effect effect

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Psychology
• Social Cognition
• Philosophy of Mind

Background:

• Theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states, is traditionally viewed as a predictive, explanatory tool.
• Recent findings suggest moral evaluations influence mental state ascriptions, challenging this view.
• The 'side-effect effect' highlights how morality impacts judgments of intentionality.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate the relationship between moral evaluations and attributions of intentional action.
• To reconcile the role of morality with the predictive function of theory of mind.
• To explore how normative considerations shape social cognition.

Main Methods:

• Three experiments were conducted to test the influence of moral evaluations on intentionality judgments.
• Participants' ascriptions of intentional action were analyzed in relation to behavioral norms.
• The study examined how norm conformity and violation affect inferences about mental states.

Main Results:

• Moral evaluations were found to inform ascriptions of intentional action.
• This influence stems from the differential informativeness of norm-conforming versus norm-violating behaviors.
• Behaviors violating norms provide richer cues to underlying mental states.

Conclusions:

• Theory of mind remains a tool for predicting and explaining behavior.
• Normative considerations are integral to social cognition and the attribution of intentionality.
• The study clarifies how social and moral factors interact within theory of mind.