Social eavesdropping and the evolution of conditional cooperation and cheating strategies

The response of bystanders to information available in their social environment can have a potent influence on the evolution of cooperation and signalling systems. In the presence of bystanders, individuals might be able to increase their payoff by exaggerating signals beyond their means (cheating) or investing to help others despite considerable costs. In doing so, animals can accrue immediate benefits by manipulating (or helping) individuals with whom they are currently interacting and delayed benefits by convincing bystanders that they are more fit or cooperative than perhaps is warranted. In this paper, I provide some illustrative examples of how bystanders could apply added positive selection pressure on both cooperative behaviour and dishonest signalling during courtship or conflict. I also discuss how the presence of bystanders might select for greater flexibility in behavioural strategies (e.g. conditional or condition dependence), which could maintain dishonesty at evolutionarily stable frequencies under some ecological conditions. By recognizing bystanders as a significant selection pressure, we might gain a more realistic approximation of what drives signalling and/or interaction dynamics in social animals.