Causal-explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Psychology
• Philosophy of Mind
• Causal Reasoning

Background:

• Philosophers and psychologists propose distinct explanation types: teleological (goals/functions) and mechanistic (causal mechanisms).
• Dominant causation theories are often unitary, focusing on either counterfactual dependence or physical connections.
• This study investigates the psychological reality of different causation approaches.

Purpose of the Study:

• To determine if distinct explanation modes (teleological vs. mechanistic) influence causal judgments.
• To examine the psychological reality of different theories of causation.
• To explore how counterfactual dependence and physical connections are weighed in causal ascriptions.

Main Methods:

• Conducted two experimental studies.
• Isolated contributions of counterfactual dependence and physical connections in causal judgments.
• Manipulated whether events were construed teleologically or mechanistically.

Main Results:

• Teleological explanations prioritize counterfactual dependence over physical connections in causal judgments.
• Mechanistic explanations consider both counterfactual dependence and physical connections.
• Causal ascriptions are sensitive to the mode of explanation used.

Conclusions:

• Both counterfactual and physical connection approaches to causation are psychologically real.
• Different explanation types (teleological, mechanistic) engage different causal judgment strategies.
• An 'exportable dependence theory' of causation can integrate physical connections and teleology based on the functions of causal ascriptions.