A priori physicalism, lonely ghosts and Cartesian doubt.

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Metaphysics

Background:

• Zombie arguments, based on physical duplicates lacking consciousness, are common in philosophy of mind.
• Ghostly arguments, based on phenomenal duplicates defined by consciousness, are less explored.
• Physicalism posits that everything is physical or supervenes on the physical.

Purpose of the Study:

• To argue that ghostly arguments possess dialectical advantages over zombie arguments.
• To demonstrate the inconsistency of ghost conceivability with specific forms of a priori physicalism.

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis of zombie and ghostly arguments.
• Examination of the conceivability of ghosts in relation to physicalist theories.
• Philosophical argumentation regarding the implications of ghost arguments for physicalism.

Main Results:

• Ghostly arguments present distinct dialectical strengths compared to zombie arguments.
• The conceivability of ghosts is shown to be incompatible with analytic functionalism.
• The conceivability of ghosts contradicts the Australian physicalism of Armstrong and Lewis.

Conclusions:

• Ghostly arguments offer a potent challenge to physicalist doctrines in the philosophy of mind.
• The neglect of ghostly arguments in the literature represents a missed opportunity for advancing anti-physicalist positions.
• Further exploration of ghostly arguments is warranted to fully assess their implications for understanding consciousness and physicalism.