The role of moral commitments in moral judgment

Area of Science:

• Moral psychology
• Cognitive science
• Philosophy

Background:

• Traditional moral psychology linked judgments to explicit philosophical commitments (consequentialism, deontology).
• Recent research suggests moral judgments stem from unconscious/emotional processes, with explicit reasoning occurring post hoc.
• This study investigates an intermediate role for moral commitments in mediating judgments without direct, consistent application.

Purpose of the Study:

• To explore the mediating role of moral commitments in moral judgments.
• To examine the relationship between individual differences in consequentialist/deontological commitments and moral judgments.
• To test how variations in moral commitments affect responses to classic moral dilemmas.

Main Methods:

• An experiment involving 336 participants.
• Assessing individual variations in consequentialist versus deontological moral commitments.
• Analyzing judgments in response to various trolley car problem scenarios.

Main Results:

• Participants' moral commitments varied, being more consequentialist or deontological.
• These variations were systematically, though imperfectly, related to judgments in trolley car problems.
• Consequentialists found actions more permissible than deontologists and adjusted judgments when presented with contrasting scenarios.

Conclusions:

• Moral commitments mediate judgments, but not always through explicit, consistent application.
• Individual differences in moral commitments (consequentialist vs. deontological) influence moral decision-making.
• A comprehensive theory of moral reasoning must account for both the links and discrepancies between commitments and judgments.