Modernizing confidence-building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention

Area of Science:

• International relations
• Biosecurity
• Public health

Background:

• The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) requires modernization to address evolving global threats.
• Current Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) are insufficient for 21st-century challenges.
• The post-Cold War scientific, health, and security landscape necessitates treaty adaptation.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose redesigning the BWC's CBMs for enhanced transparency and compliance.
• To expand the scope of CBMs to include emerging biological risks.
• To shift CBM focus from hardware to governance and institutional frameworks.

Main Methods:

• Analysis of the BWC's current CBMs and their limitations.
• Review of evolving global biological threats, including terrorism, accidents, and pandemics.
• Proposal for revising CBMs to encompass biosafety, biosecurity, and dual-use research oversight.

Main Results:

• Expanded CBMs can address a wider range of biological risks beyond traditional warfare.
• Modernized CBMs enhance relevance to states' priorities and concerns.
• Shifting focus to 'software' (governance) strengthens the treaty's effectiveness.

Conclusions:

• Redesigning CBMs is crucial for modernizing the Biological Weapons Convention.
• Broader CBM scope and a focus on governance improve international cooperation against biological threats.
• Enhanced CBMs promote treaty universality and global biosecurity.