The mind as skills and dispositions: on normativity and mediation

On the occasion of the critique of Alfredo Gaete and Carlos Cornejo, this article explains and extends the hybrid theory of the mind that I recently presented in this journal. Taking inspiration from Rom Harré's program for a hybrid psychology, the theory is supposed to be integrative and aims to broaden Harré's hybrid psychology by including not just the brain, but also the body, social practices, and technological artifacts as mediators of the mind. The mind is understood not as a substance of any kind, but as a set of skills and dispositions to act, think, and feel. This implies a normative view of the mind, according to which psychological phenomena do not simply happen, but are done, and can consequently be done more or less well. I provide arguments in favor of grounding psychology in normativity rather than conscious experience, and I explain why the emphasis on mediators does not represent a threat to the ontological primacy of the person in psychology.