Some thoughts on essence placeholders, interactionism, and heritability: reply to Haslam (2011) and Turkheimer (2011)

In the target article (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011), we provided a social-cognitive framework which identified genetic essentialist biases and their implications. In their commentaries, Haslam (2011) and Turkheimer (2011) indicated their general agreement with this framework but highlighted some important points for consideration. Haslam suggested that neuroessentialism is a comparable kind of essentialist bias and identified similarities with the genetic essentialism framework. In response, we acknowledge similarities but also identify qualitative and quantitative differences between genetic essentialism and other kinds of essentialist biases. Turkheimer challenged us to extend our discussion to address the question of how should people respond to genetic etiological information, critiqued the use of heritability coefficients, and identified a new construct (1 - rMZ), which may be termed a free-will coefficient. In response, we emphasize the need to transform interactionist explanations from being empty platitudes to becoming the default conceptual framework; we wholeheartedly accept his critical view of heritability coefficient estimates (but acknowledge a more limited utility for them); and we are intrigued by his conceptual interest in identifying free-will coefficients yet warn against falling into pitfalls similar to those that were stumbled into in the past.