Related Experiment Video
Updated: May 28, 2026

Combining Behavioral Endocrinology and Experimental Economics: Testosterone and Social Decision Making
Published on: March 2, 2011
The evolution of punishment in n-player public goods games: a volunteer's dilemma
Nichola J Raihani1, Redouan Bshary
1Institute of Zoology, Zoological Society of London, Regent's Park, London. NW1 4RY, United Kingdom. nichola.raihani@ioz.ac.uk
Abstract:
The evolution of punishment to stabilize cooperation in n-player games has been treated as a second-order social dilemma, where contributions to punishment of free-riders are altruistic. Hence it may only evolve under highly restricted conditions. Here, we build on recent insights using the volunteer's dilemma as an alternative payoff matrix for the evolution of cooperation. The key feature of a volunteer's dilemma is that the benefits of cooperation are a nonlinear function of the number of contributors, meaning that cooperation is negatively frequency dependent. We propose that nonlinear returns are also an inherent feature of punishment and that this insight allows for a simple and novel explanation of how punishment evolves in groups.
Related Concept Videos
Milgram's Obedience to Authority
Egoism and Altruism
Ethical Dilemmas II
The Stanford Prison Experiment
Persuasion Strategies
Ethical Dilemmas I
Let us explore some examples to understand the potentially complex moral decisions nurses face.
Take the case of caring for minors, particularly in areas related to reproductive...