[Jaspers and the problem of understanding: a plea for revision]

Understanding (Verstehen), as far as it is discussed explicitly in psychiatry, is based on Dilthey's dichotomy "nature we explain, the life of the soul we understand ( , 144). According to this doctrine, understanding is concerned with a person's inner life and consequently, its method consists in putting oneself in the other's position and reliving their experience. Jaspers' concept of understanding - which is regarded as definitive for psychiatry by advocates and opponents alike - is commonly interpreted according to this tradition as well.

I shall argue here that this position does not stand up to scrutiny. It is a mistake to simplify Dilthey's concept of understanding to a form of mere psychologism. In fact, Jaspers practically tore this position down. In his own account, by contrast, he utilises Max Weber and Rickert to established a third realm in addition to a person's inner life on the one hand and their bodily nature on the other: the realm of the objective products of the human mind. It is this dimension that is essential for understanding. Such a transition from the dichotomy of explaining and understanding to a three-valued logic requires a radical rethinking of the traditional notion of understanding. Jaspers meets this demand but he does so only implicitly and not always consistently so that it might easily be missed. It is nonetheless crucial to see that Jaspers in fact rejects the hermeneutics of empathy which are commonly attributed to him and for which he is often criticised.

In conclusion of this essay, I will suggest some implications of this - often overlooked - distinction for psychiatry and psychology.