Existence: who needs it? The non-identity problem and merely possible people

Area of Science:

• Moral Philosophy
• Ethics
• Reproductive Ethics

Background:

• Formulating procreative principles requires identifying whose interests merit moral consideration.
• Existing and future individuals uncontroversially warrant moral concern.
• The moral status of merely possible individuals remains a contentious issue in ethics.

Purpose of the Study:

• To analyze the role of merely possible, non-existent entities in moral reasoning, particularly concerning procreation.
• To critically evaluate and refute the arguments of Velleman and Hare regarding merely possible people and the non-identity problem.
• To establish a common-sense ethical framework for determining moral relevance in procreative decision-making.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis of arguments concerning moral consideration for non-existent individuals.
• Critique of Velleman's and Hare's positions on the non-identity problem and merely possible people.
• Application of ethical theories to hypothetical non-identity cases in procreation.

Main Results:

• Velleman's and Hare's views on the moral relevance of merely possible people are found to be inadequate.
• Difficulties arise when attempting to apply their theories to practical non-identity scenarios.
• The study demonstrates the challenges in extending moral consideration beyond actual or future existents.

Conclusions:

• The moral relevance of individuals is limited to those who exist, have existed, or will exist.
• Merely possible individuals, who do not and will not exist, do not possess interests that warrant moral consideration.
• A common-sense ethical approach prioritizes the well-being of actual and future persons in procreative decisions.