Uncertainty plus prior equals rational bias: an intuitive Bayesian probability weighting function

Empirical research has shown that when making choices based on probabilistic options, people behave as if they overestimate small probabilities, underestimate large probabilities, and treat positive and negative outcomes differently. These distortions have been modeled using a nonlinear probability weighting function, which is found in several nonexpected utility theories, including rank-dependent models and prospect theory; here, we propose a Bayesian approach to the probability weighting function and, with it, a psychological rationale. In the real world, uncertainty is ubiquitous and, accordingly, the optimal strategy is to combine probability statements with prior information using Bayes' rule. First, we show that any reasonable prior on probabilities leads to 2 of the observed effects; overweighting of low probabilities and underweighting of high probabilities. We then investigate 2 plausible kinds of priors: informative priors based on previous experience and uninformative priors of ignorance. Individually, these priors potentially lead to large problems of bias and inefficiency, respectively; however, when combined using Bayesian model comparison methods, both forms of prior can be applied adaptively, gaining the efficiency of empirical priors and the robustness of ignorance priors. We illustrate this for the simple case of generic good and bad options, using Internet blogs to estimate the relevant priors of inference. Given this combined ignorant/informative prior, the Bayesian probability weighting function is not only robust and efficient but also matches all of the major characteristics of the distortions found in empirical research.