Environmental justice, values, and scientific expertise.

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Science
• Environmental Ethics
• Science and Values Studies

Background:

• The traditional "value-free ideal" in science is increasingly challenged.
• Philosophical proposals attempt to reconcile scientific objectivity with the role of values.
• Existing frameworks for value-in-science lack comprehensive applicability.

Purpose of the Study:

• To compare two prominent philosophical proposals on the interaction of values and science.
• To evaluate these proposals using a case study from environmental justice research.
• To determine which proposal offers a more robust framework for understanding value-laden science.

Main Methods:

• Comparative philosophical analysis of two distinct models for value-in-science.
• Application of these models to a specific case study in environmental justice.
• Argumentation for the superiority of one model based on the case study analysis.

Main Results:

• The proposal distinguishing epistemic and nonepistemic values demonstrates greater utility.
• The direct/indirect roles of values distinction proves less effective in the case study.
• The epistemic/nonepistemic framework better accommodates the complexities of value-laden research.

Conclusions:

• The distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values provides a more advantageous framework for understanding the role of values in science.
• This framework offers improved clarity for navigating disputed scientific research, such as in environmental justice.
• Rejection of the value-free ideal necessitates clear guidelines for value integration, which this model provides.