On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Psychology
• Moral Philosophy
• Neuroscience

Background:

• Joshua Greene's dual process model posits automatic processing yields deontological judgments, while controlled processing yields utilitarian judgments.
• This model has significantly influenced the understanding of moral decision-making and its underlying cognitive mechanisms.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically evaluate and clarify Joshua Greene's dual process model of moral judgment.
• To reassess the relationship between cognitive processing modes and moral judgment content (deontological vs. utilitarian).

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis of evidence supporting the dual process model.
• Examination of alternative interpretations of cognitive processes in moral judgment.
• Review of neuroimaging studies on moral decision-making.

Main Results:

• The proposed link between controlled processing and utilitarian judgment may stem from a misinterpretation of evidence.
• Evidence attributed to 'utilitarian reasoning' might actually reflect moral deliberation conflicting with utilitarianism.
• Neuroimaging data indicates similar neural correlates for intuitive and counterintuitive judgments, irrespective of their deontological or utilitarian content.

Conclusions:

• The direct association between specific processing modes and moral judgment outcomes in Greene's model is questionable.
• An alternative account suggests that deliberation in moral judgment, even when seemingly utilitarian, can be at odds with a utilitarian framework.
• Neural evidence does not exclusively support distinct processing modes for deontological versus utilitarian judgments.