The probabilities of conditionals revisited

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Language
• Logic
• Probability Theory

Background:

• The 'Equation' posits that the probability of an indicative conditional equals the conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent.
• Triviality arguments, notably by Lewis, have led to a consensus that this Equation is only tenable if indicative conditionals do not express propositions.

Purpose of the Study:

• To challenge the prevailing philosophical assessment of the Equation for indicative conditionals.
• To investigate the tenability of the Equation by questioning a core assumption in existing triviality arguments.

Main Methods:

• The study presents novel data.
• This data is used to cast doubt on a fundamental assumption underpinning established triviality arguments against the Equation.

Main Results:

• The presented data challenges a key assumption in philosophical arguments concerning indicative conditionals.
• This suggests that the Equation may be tenable without necessarily abandoning the view that indicative conditionals express propositions.

Conclusions:

• The study provides grounds to reconsider the widely held view that the Equation for indicative conditionals leads to triviality.
• Further research is warranted to explore the implications of these findings for the semantics of indicative conditionals.