Abortion, infanticide and moral context

Area of Science:

• Bioethics
• Moral Philosophy
• Medical Ethics

Background:

• Philosophers Giubilini and Minerva argue for infanticide based on arguments for abortion.
• Their reasoning posits that neither fetuses nor newborns possess a right to life, thus justifying infanticide under similar conditions as abortion.
• They contend that infanticide is permissible even when not primarily serving the newborn's best interests.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically analyze the ethical arguments presented by Giubilini and Minerva regarding infanticide and abortion.
• To evaluate the logical validity of extending abortion justifications to infanticide.
• To explore the role of moral context in ethical decision-making concerning fetuses and newborns.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical argumentation and critical analysis.
• Examination of ethical principles related to the right to life.
• Analysis of moral context and its influence on justificatory reasoning.

Main Results:

• The conclusion that reasons justifying abortion also justify infanticide is found to be logically flawed.
• The absence of a right to life is not the sole determining factor in moral permissibility.
• Generalizing ethical justifications across dissimilar moral contexts (fetus vs. newborn) is invalid.

Conclusions:

• The moral equivalence of killing fetuses and newborns is only valid in identical moral contexts, which are practically non-existent.
• Ethical considerations for newborns require distinct moral contexts and justifications separate from those for fetuses.
• The argument presented by Giubilini and Minerva fails to establish a sound ethical basis for infanticide mirroring abortion justifications.