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Published on: May 3, 2016
Information asymmetry and deception.
Irma Clots-Figueras1, Roberto Hernán-González2, Praveen Kujal3
1Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Spain.
In economic games, deception is common. When investors lack information about multipliers, trustees are more likely to lie, influencing investor beliefs.
Area of Science:
- Behavioral Economics
- Game Theory
- Experimental Economics
Background:
- Deception is prevalent in economic transactions.
- Standard investment games offer a framework to study trust and deception.
- Information asymmetry can facilitate deceptive practices.
Purpose of the Study:
- To investigate the nature and prevalence of deception in a modified investment game.
- To analyze the impact of information asymmetry on deceptive behavior.
- To examine how investor beliefs are affected by trustee messages.
Main Methods:
- Modification of the standard economics investment game.
- Introduction of a trustee with private information about a multiplier (k).
- Analysis of trustee messaging strategies and investor responses.
Main Results:
- 66% of trustees sent false messages regarding the multiplier (k).
- Investors exhibited naivety, with nearly half believing the messages.
- Lying increased when investors were unaware of the multiplier's distribution.
Conclusions:
- Information asymmetry significantly increases deceptive behavior in economic interactions.
- Investor beliefs about potential gains are influenced by messages, especially when distributions are unknown.
- The study highlights the role of information in mitigating or exacerbating deception.
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