Why the cognitive science of religion cannot rescue 'spiritual care'

Peter Kevern believes that the cognitive science of religion (CSR) provides a justification for the idea of spiritual care in the health services. In this paper, I suggest that he is mistaken on two counts. First, CSR does not entail the conclusions Kevern wants to draw. His treatment of it consists largely of nonsequiturs. I show this by presenting an account of CSR, and then explaining why Kevern's reasons for thinking it rescues 'spirituality' discourse do not work. Second, the debate about spirituality-in-health is about classification: what shall count as a 'spiritual need' and what shall count as 'spiritual care'. It is about the politics of meaning, an exercise in persuasive definition. The function of 'spirituality' talk in health care is to change the denotation of 'spiritual', and attach its indelibly religious connotations to as many health-related concepts and practices as possible. CSR, however plausible it may be as a theory of the origins and pervasiveness of religious belief, is irrelevant to this debate.