Two Distinct Moral Mechanisms for Ascribing and Denying Intentionality

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Science
• Moral Psychology
• Experimental Philosophy

Background:

• Philosophers and legal scholars have long debated intentionality's role in morality and culpability.
• Experimental philosophy reveals a puzzling asymmetry: negative outcomes are judged as more intentional than positive ones.
• The underlying mechanism for this asymmetry remains unclear, with no scientific consensus.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate the mechanisms underlying the asymmetry in intentionality judgments.
• To propose and validate a novel two-mechanism model explaining this phenomenon.
• To explore the influence of morality on judgments of intentionality.

Main Methods:

• Utilizing converging behavioral and neural evidence.
• Employing experimental designs to differentiate between proposed mechanisms.
• Analyzing judgments of intentionality in scenarios with varying consequences.

Main Results:

• Demonstrating that two distinct mechanisms, not one, generate the intentionality asymmetry.
• Identifying emotion as a driver for intentionality in negative-consequence scenarios.
• Identifying statistical norms as a factor in denying intentionality for positive-consequence scenarios.

Conclusions:

• The study presents a novel two-mechanism model for intentionality judgments.
• Morality can paradoxically shape perceptions of intentionality.
• Findings have significant implications for legal concepts like mens rea and philosophical debates on actions like terror bombing, abortion, and euthanasia.