Instrumental harm and impartial beneficence distinctively frame cognitive representations of moral decision problems

Area of Science:

• Moral Psychology
• Neuroethics
• Decision Science

Background:

• Utilitarianism posits that actions are moral if they maximize overall welfare.
• Individual differences in utilitarianism are characterized by instrumental harm (IH) and impartial beneficence (IB).
• These dimensions may function as intuitive theories guiding moral cognition.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate whether instrumental harm and impartial beneficence frame distinct patterns of moral judgment and behavior.
• To explore the neural correlates of these utilitarian dimensions using functional neuroimaging.
• To determine if shared or dissimilar endorsement of IH and IB influences cognitive representations of moral choices.

Main Methods:

• Intersubject representational similarity analysis (RSA) was applied to behavioral data (N=254).
• Functional neuroimaging data (N=68) were analyzed using intersubject RSA.
• Moral judgments, decision-making, and neural encoding of moral choice attributes were assessed.

Main Results:

• Shared endorsement of IH or IB correlated with similar moral judgment and decision-making patterns.
• Similar IH/IB endorsement was linked to similar neural encoding of moral choice attributes, irrespective of actual choices.
• Dissimilar IH/IB endorsement led to distinctive neural encoding, even with similar choices.
• Similarity/dissimilarity patterns were localized to distinct brain regions for IH and IB.

Conclusions:

• Instrumental harm and impartial beneficence distinctly frame cognitive representations in moral decision-making.
• These dimensions influence neural processing of moral choices beyond guiding overt judgments and decisions.
• The findings provide insight into the cognitive architecture of utilitarian moral reasoning.