Strange Bedfellows? Common Ground on the Moral Status Question

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Medicine
• Developmental Biology
• Bioethics

Background:

• The question of when a developing human acquires moral status is a central debate in bioethics.
• Existing philosophical frameworks often rely on identifying specific, morally salient developmental events.

Purpose of the Study:

• To analyze substance ontology-based positions on the moral status of developing humans.
• To evaluate empirical objections to these positions and their generalizability.

Main Methods:

• Outlining three distinct positions grounded in substance ontology.
• Examining and refuting specific empirical objections to one position.
• Generalizing objections and responses to other substance-based approaches.

Main Results:

• Substance ontology attempts to pinpoint a specific event for moral status acquisition.
• Empirical objections to one position were refuted.
• These objections and their refutations were shown to apply broadly to other substance-based views.

Conclusions:

• All substance ontology approaches to determining human moral status require an appeal to dispositions.
• The reliance on dispositions highlights a fundamental limitation in these philosophical frameworks.