Self-deception as affective coping. An empirical perspective on philosophical issues.

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Psychology
• Philosophy

Background:

• Self-deception is primarily analyzed through paradoxes in philosophical literature.
• It is widely accepted that self-deception serves to protect individuals from distress.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose a new model of self-deception grounded in affective coping.
• To integrate findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology into the understanding of self-deception.
• To re-examine philosophical paradoxes of self-deception using an emotional framework.

Main Methods:

• Critique of existing solutions to self-deception paradoxes.
• Presentation of a novel approach to self-deception based on emotional mechanisms.
• Analysis of cognitive and neural processes underlying the appraisal of distressing and flattering evidence.

Main Results:

• Self-deception involves appraising distressing evidence as uncertain, with low coping potential and negative anticipation (linked to Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis).
• Dopamine influences the processing of flattering evidence, driven by desire.
• Emotional mechanisms in self-deception prioritize immediate rewards over potential long-term negative consequences.

Conclusions:

• Self-deception is fundamentally an affective coping strategy.
• An emotional model, integrating cognitive neuroscience and psychology, offers a new perspective on self-deception.
• This model provides a framework for revisiting and resolving philosophical paradoxes associated with self-deception.