Intentionality, Morality, and the Incest Taboo in Madagascar.

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Anthropology
• Moral Psychology
• Cross-cultural Psychology

Background:

• Astuti and Bloch (2015) proposed Malagasy ambivalence regarding intentionality in incest moral judgments.
• They linked this to a 'dumbfounding' reaction to incest as a social order violation.
• This was compared to moral dumbfounding observed in US populations.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically evaluate Astuti and Bloch's claims on Malagasy moral judgments and intentionality.
• To examine the evidence for Malagasy ambivalence concerning incest's consequences.
• To assess the coherence of the 'transcendental social order' hypothesis and its cross-cultural applicability.

Main Methods:

• Critical analysis of existing anthropological and psychological literature.
• Re-examination of claims regarding Malagasy moral judgments on incest.
• Comparative analysis of cultural explanations for moral dumbfounding.

Main Results:

• Astuti and Bloch's claims regarding Malagasy ambivalence and intentionality are found to be unclear and lack sufficient evidential support.
• The proposed link between incest, transcendental social order violation, and irrelevance of intentionality lacks coherence.
• The extension of this explanation to US moral dumbfounding is deemed unwarranted.

Conclusions:

• The original claims about Malagasy moral psychology concerning incest require further clarification and empirical investigation.
• The 'dumbfounding' explanation for moral judgments on incest may not be universally applicable or coherent.
• Further research is needed to understand cultural variations in moral reasoning, particularly concerning taboo subjects.