Mechanistic explanation, cognitive systems demarcation, and extended cognition

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Cognitive Science
• Philosophy of Science

Background:

• The internalism-externalism debate in philosophy of mind traditionally relies on metaphysical considerations.
• Recently, explanatory considerations have gained traction for cognitive system demarcation, offering potentially more neutral grounds.
• However, existing explanation-based approaches have been criticized for failing to resolve the internalism-externalism stalemate.

Purpose of the Study:

• To challenge the claim that only metaphysical approaches can solve the internalism-externalism debate.
• To develop a more promising explanation-oriented framework for cognitive system demarcation.
• To determine the explanatory viability of internalist versus externalist conceptions of cognition.

Main Methods:

• Elaboration of a novel explanation-oriented framework for cognitive system demarcation.
• Extension of the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms.
• Inclusion of the criterion of 'fat-handedness' to address the cognitive systems demarcation problem.

Main Results:

• The proposed framework, incorporating mutual manipulability and 'fat-handedness', offers a plausible method for cognitive system demarcation.
• This approach can decide between internalist and externalist conceptions of cognition on a case-by-case basis.
• Analysis reveals why other recent mechanistic approaches to cognitive system demarcation have been unsuccessful.

Conclusions:

• Explanation-based approaches, when properly formulated, can effectively address the cognitive systems demarcation problem.
• The mutual manipulability account, augmented with 'fat-handedness', provides a robust tool for resolving the internalism-externalism debate.
• The framework is illustrated with a case study involving gestures and learning.