Emotion and false memory: The context-content paradox

False memories are influenced by a variety of factors, but emotion is a variable of special significance, for theoretical and practical reasons. Interestingly, emotion's effects on false memory depend on whether it is embedded in the content of to-be-remembered events or in our moods, where mood is an aspect of the context in which events are encoded. We sketch the theoretical basis for this content-context dissociation and then review accumulated evidence that content and context effects are indeed different. Paradoxically, we find that in experiments on spontaneous and implanted false memories, negatively valenced content foments distortion, but negatively valenced moods protect against it. In addition, correlational data show that enduring negative natural moods (e.g., depression) foment false memory. Current opponent-process models of false memory, such as fuzzy-trace theory, are able to explain the content-context dissociation: Variations in emotional content primarily affect memory for the gist of events, whereas variations in emotional context primarily affect memory for events' exact verbatim form. Important questions remain about how these effects are modulated by variations in memory tests and in arousal. Promising methods of tackling those questions are outlined, especially designs that separate the gist and verbatim influences of emotion. (PsycINFO Database Record