Carbon emission allowance allocation with a mixed mechanism in air passenger transport

Air passenger transport carbon emissions have become a great challenge for both governments and airlines because of rapid developments in the aviation industry in recent decades. In this paper, a mixed mechanism composed of a cap-and-trade mechanism and a carbon tax mechanism is developed to assist governments in allocating carbon emission allowances to airlines operating on the routes. Combined this mixed mechanism with an equilibrium strategy, a bi-level multi-objective model is proposed for an air passenger transport carbon emission allowance allocation problem, in which a government is considered as a leader and the airlines as the followers. An interactive solution approach integrating a genetic algorithm and an interactive evolutionary mechanism is designed to search for satisfactory solutions of the proposed model. A case study is then presented to show its practicality and efficiency in mitigating carbon emissions. Sensitivity analyses under different tradable and taxable levels are also conducted, which can give the government insights as to the tradeoffs between lowering carbon intensity and improving airlines' operations. The computational results demonstrate that the mixed mechanism can assist greatly in carbon emission mitigation for air passenger transport and therefore, it should be established as part of air passenger transport carbon emission policies.