Behavioral Modeling of Adversaries with Multiple Objectives in Counterterrorism

Area of Science:

• Security studies
• Behavioral economics
• Game theory

Background:

• Traditional attacker-defender models assume rational actors optimizing individual costs.
• Recent research explores multi-objective attackers and deviations from rational behavior.
• Existing models lack integration of attacker's multiple objectives with adaptive responses to defender actions.

Purpose of the Study:

• To extend attacker-defender models by incorporating multiple terrorist objectives and adaptive behaviors.
• To account for deviations from rational decision-making in terrorist attack planning.
• To develop a more realistic model of terrorist behavior for defense strategy optimization.

Main Methods:

• Utilized multiattribute prospect theory to model attacker behavior.
• Incorporated multiple objectives and adaptive responses to defender actions.
• Evaluated the model with a scenario of radioactive material smuggling into the U.S.

Main Results:

• Multiattribute prospect theory effectively models terrorists with multiple objectives and non-rational decision-making.
• The model captures the adaptive tradeoffs terrorists consider in response to defender actions.
• Demonstrated the application in a radioactive material smuggling scenario.

Conclusions:

• Integrating multiple objectives and bounded rationality provides a more accurate representation of terrorist behavior.
• Continued research is crucial for developing effective defensive strategies against evolving terrorist threats.
• The proposed modeling approach offers a pathway to avoid misrepresenting terrorist decision-making in security contexts.