Jove
Visualize
Contact Us
JoVE
x logofacebook logolinkedin logoyoutube logo
ABOUT JoVE
OverviewLeadershipBlogJoVE Help Center
AUTHORS
Publishing ProcessEditorial BoardScope & PoliciesPeer ReviewFAQSubmit
LIBRARIANS
TestimonialsSubscriptionsAccessResourcesLibrary Advisory BoardFAQ
RESEARCH
JoVE JournalMethods CollectionsJoVE Encyclopedia of ExperimentsArchive
EDUCATION
JoVE CoreJoVE BusinessJoVE Science EducationJoVE Lab ManualFaculty Resource CenterFaculty Site
Terms & Conditions of Use
Privacy Policy
Policies

Related Concept Videos

Social Foundations of Self I: Play and Game01:24

Social Foundations of Self I: Play and Game

232
The development of self in children is deeply rooted in social interactions, mainly through stages of play and structured games. These stages, outlined by sociologist George Herbert Mead, illustrate how children progressively learn to understand and adopt social roles, forming a cohesive sense of self.The Play Stage: Imitation and Simple Role-TakingIn the early years of childhood, the play stage is characterized by imitative behavior, where children engage in role-playing based on familiar...
232
Natural Selection and Mating Preferences01:06

Natural Selection and Mating Preferences

570
The principle of natural selection posits that organisms better adapted to their environment are more likely to survive and reproduce. This principle is closely intertwined with mating preferences, a key aspect of sexual selection, which evolutionary psychologists believe is driven by instincts to propagate one's genes. Such instincts significantly influence mating behaviors and preferences between genders.
Females, due to their biological roles in conception, pregnancy, and nursing,...
570
Trait and State Self-Esteem02:08

Trait and State Self-Esteem

11.5K
The term self-esteem is often used generically, to refer to how people feel about themselves. However, according to research, there are three distinct constructs that should not be used interchangeably (Brown & Marshall, 2006). 
11.5K
Archival Research01:40

Archival Research

17.3K
Some researchers gain access to large amounts of data without interacting with a single research participant. Instead, they use existing records to answer various research questions. This type of research approach is known as archival research. Archival research relies on looking at past records or data sets to look for interesting patterns or relationships. For example, a researcher might access the academic records of all individuals who enrolled in college within the past ten years and...
17.3K
Social Scripts02:10

Social Scripts

10.3K
People tend to know what behavior is expected of them in specific, familiar settings. A script is a person’s knowledge about the sequence of events expected in a specific setting (Schank & Abelson, 1977). Essentially, scripts are a particular kind of schema, one containing default values for the features within an event. In the restaurant example, the script's features include the props (e.g., tables, menu, food, and money), the roles to be played (e.g., customer and waiter),...
10.3K
Covalent Bonding and Lewis Structures02:46

Covalent Bonding and Lewis Structures

62.8K
Compared to ionic bonds, which results from the transfer of electrons between metallic and nonmetallic atoms, covalent bonds result from the mutual attraction of atoms for a “shared” pair of electrons.
62.8K

You might also read

Related Articles

Articles linked to this work by shared authors, journal, and citation graph.

Sort by
Same author

Reducing modest risks: Valuation or disposition?

Journal of experimental psychology. Applied·2025
See all related articles

Related Experiment Video

Updated: Feb 12, 2026

The Collective Trust Game: An Online Group Adaptation of the Trust Game Based on the HoneyComb Paradigm
06:18

The Collective Trust Game: An Online Group Adaptation of the Trust Game Based on the HoneyComb Paradigm

Published on: October 20, 2022

2.6K

Evolutionarily stable conjectures and other regarding preferences in duopoly games.

Ilkka Leppänen1

  • 1School of Business and Economics, Loughborough University, Loughborough, LE11 3TU UK.

Journal of Evolutionary Economics
|April 3, 2018
PubMed
Summary

This study explores how "other-regarding preferences" influence economic conjectures in duopoly games. Evolutionarily stable conjectures differ from consistent ones, especially with spiteful preferences, impacting quantities and prices.

Keywords:
Conjectural variationsDuopolyEvolutionary stabilityOther regarding preferences

More Related Videos

Stereoacuity Improvement using Random-Dot Video Games
06:25

Stereoacuity Improvement using Random-Dot Video Games

Published on: January 14, 2020

15.0K
Measuring Engagement of Spectators of Social Digital Games
14:02

Measuring Engagement of Spectators of Social Digital Games

Published on: July 3, 2021

4.0K

Related Experiment Videos

Last Updated: Feb 12, 2026

The Collective Trust Game: An Online Group Adaptation of the Trust Game Based on the HoneyComb Paradigm
06:18

The Collective Trust Game: An Online Group Adaptation of the Trust Game Based on the HoneyComb Paradigm

Published on: October 20, 2022

2.6K
Stereoacuity Improvement using Random-Dot Video Games
06:25

Stereoacuity Improvement using Random-Dot Video Games

Published on: January 14, 2020

15.0K
Measuring Engagement of Spectators of Social Digital Games
14:02

Measuring Engagement of Spectators of Social Digital Games

Published on: July 3, 2021

4.0K

Area of Science:

  • Behavioral Economics
  • Game Theory
  • Evolutionary Game Theory

Background:

  • Players in economic models often exhibit 'other-regarding preferences,' considering payoff distributions.
  • Duopoly games (Cournot and Bertrand) are foundational models for analyzing market competition.

Purpose of the Study:

  • To investigate the evolutionary selection of conjectures in duopoly games with other-regarding preferences.
  • To determine how these preferences affect consistent and evolutionarily stable conjectures.

Main Methods:

  • Analysis of Cournot and Bertrand duopoly models.
  • Examination of evolutionary stability concepts applied to economic conjectures.
  • Comparative analysis of consistent versus evolutionarily stable conjectures under varying preference structures.

Main Results:

  • Consistent conjectures in both Cournot and Bertrand games remain independent of other-regarding preferences.
  • Evolutionarily stable conjectures are dependent on other-regarding preferences and diverge from consistent conjectures.
  • Increasing spiteful preferences lead to low quantities (Cournot) and high prices (Bertrand) in evolutionarily stable conjectures, contrasting with consistent conjectures.

Conclusions:

  • Other-regarding preferences significantly shape evolutionarily stable conjectures, not just consistent ones.
  • The findings offer insights into ultimate and proximate causation in economic behavior.
  • Divergence between consistent and evolutionarily stable conjectures highlights the complexity of strategic decision-making in imperfect competition.