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Asymmetric evolutionary game dynamics based on individuals' own volition
Qiao-Qiao He1, Tian-Jiao Feng2, Yi Tao3
1Key Laboratory of Animal Ecology and Conservation Biology, Centre for Computational and Evolutionary Biology, Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, PR China.
Journal of Theoretical Biology
|May 19, 2018
Summary
This study introduces a new evolutionary game model where individuals can choose interactions and end them voluntarily. The findings suggest new possibilities for asymmetric evolutionary game dynamics.
Area of Science:
- Evolutionary Game Theory
- Behavioral Ecology
- Mathematical Biology
Background:
- Individual behavior in pairwise interactions depends on action choice and opponent preference.
- Classic iterated game models often lack individual volition in interaction duration and termination.
Purpose of the Study:
- To develop a novel two-phenotype iterated bimatrix replicator dynamics model.
- To incorporate individual volition in initiating and terminating interactions.
- To explore the evolutionary stability and equilibrium of asymmetric games.
Main Methods:
- Developed a two-phenotype iterated bimatrix replicator dynamics model.
- Incorporated limited interaction time and unilateral termination of interactions.
- Analyzed the conditions for locally asymmetrically stable interior equilibrium.
Main Results:
- Demonstrated the possibility of locally asymmetrically stable interior equilibrium.
- Showed that the system's evolutionary stability resembles classic asymmetric evolutionary games.
- Identified key factors influencing interaction dynamics and evolutionary outcomes.
Conclusions:
- The developed model offers a new perspective on evolutionary game dynamics.
- Individual volition in interactions significantly impacts evolutionary stability.
- Provides insights into the evolutionary significance of asymmetric game dynamics.