Attacker-defender game from a network science perspective.

Area of Science:

• Game Theory
• Network Science
• Cybersecurity

Background:

• Critical infrastructure protection is vital, with game theory modeling attacker-defender interactions.
• Existing models often overlook interdependencies within infrastructure systems.
• Complex networks are increasingly used to represent infrastructure topology.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose a novel simultaneous-move attacker-defender game model for critical infrastructures.
• To incorporate the topological structure of infrastructure systems into game strategies.
• To analyze strategic interactions considering component interrelationships.

Main Methods:

• Developed a two-player, zero-sum static game with complete information.
• Defined strategies and payoffs based on complex network topology.
• Constrained strategies to targeted and random approaches.
• Simulated scenarios on scale-free networks.

Main Results:

• In scale-free networks, attackers predominantly opt for random strategies at Nash equilibrium.
• Defenders prioritize hub targets (high-degree nodes) when the cost-sensitive parameter is low.
• Defenders shift to random protection strategies when the cost-sensitive parameter exceeds a threshold.

Conclusions:

• The proposed game model offers a new theoretical framework for analyzing attacker-defender dynamics in critical infrastructures.
• Understanding strategic choices in complex network environments is crucial for effective infrastructure defense.
• The study highlights the importance of network topology in shaping optimal attack and defense strategies.