The Whewell-Mill debate on predictions, from Mill's point of view

John Stuart Mill, in his debate with William Whewell on the nature and logic of induction, is regarded as being the first to dismiss the supposed value of successful predictions as merely psychological. I shall argue that this view of the Whewell-Mill debate on predictions misconstrues Mill's position and argument. From Mill's point of view, the controversial point was not the question whether predictions 'count more' than ex-post explanations but the alleged assertion by Whewell that the successful predictions of the wave theory of light prove the existence of the ether. Mill argued that, on the one hand, the predictions of the wave theory of light do not and cannot provide evidence for the existence of the ether; as evidence for the laws of the theory, on the other hand, the predictions are superfluous, the laws being already well-confirmed. Mill actually endorsed a requirement of independent support closely resembling Whewell's requirements for hypotheses; the controversy on the value of predictions is a product of the 20th century.