Does Separating Intentionality From Mental Representation Imply Radical Enactivism?

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Cognitive Science
• Neuroscience

Background:

• Traditional views equate intentionality with mental states, posing challenges for naturalization within the physical order.
• Enactivist approaches often conflate intentionality and mental representation, hindering a comprehensive naturalistic account.
• Existing frameworks struggle to delineate the scope of cognitive science and accommodate artificial intelligence.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose a novel distinction between intentionality as a feature of embodied agents and representation as a feature of mental states.
• To re-evaluate the naturalization of intentionality and representation, particularly in light of Metzinger's work.
• To delineate the subject matter of cognitive science and explore implications for artificial intelligence.

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis and theoretical argumentation.
• Distinguishing intentionality (agent-directedness) from representation (mental state content).
• Developing a layered, developmental model of intentionality.

Main Results:

• Intentionality is proposed as a property of embodied agents, while representation is a property of mental states.
• This distinction allows for agents with intentionality directed at existent things but lacking representation.
• A hierarchical model of intentionality is presented, from basic goal pursuit to abstract thought.

Conclusions:

• Separating intentionality and representation offers a more robust framework for naturalizing mental phenomena.
• The proposed model clarifies the scope of cognitive science and supports the possibility of artificial general intelligence.
• Intentionality is a layered concept, with higher forms of representation enabling directedness towards non-existent entities.