A cognitive, non-selectionist account of moral externalism
1Department of Philosophy,University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point,Stevens Point,WI 54481-3897.jzinser@uwsp.eduhttps://www.uwsp.edu/philosophy/Pages/AboutUs/FacultyStaff/jZinser.aspx.
Abstract:
A general feature of our moral psychology is that we feel that some moral demands are motivated externally. Stanford explains this feature with an evolutionary account, such that moral externalism was selected for its ability to facilitate prosocial interactions. Alternatively, I argue that a cognitive, non-selectionist account of moral externalism is a more parsimonious explanation.
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