Emotions and beliefs about morality can change one another

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Psychology
• Moral Psychology
• Social Psychology

Background:

• Dual-process theories suggest beliefs and emotions interact.
• Previous research has not fully elucidated the bidirectional relationship between emotions and beliefs in moral reasoning.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate the interplay between emotions and beliefs concerning moral assertions.
• To determine if this relationship differs between moral and factual assertions.
• To establish causal links between emotions, beliefs, and moral assertions.

Main Methods:

• Three experiments demonstrated a correlation between the pleasantness of moral assertions and their believability.
• A distinction was made between moral assertions (e.g., "should be") and factual assertions (e.g., "are").
• Two further experiments used memory recall and reason generation to establish causality.

Main Results:

• Pleasantness of moral assertions positively correlated with belief strength (subjective probability).
• This correlation was absent for factual assertions, but emerged when factual assertions were reframed as moral.
• Recalling positive memories increased belief; negative memories decreased it.
• Generating reasons to believe increased emotional pleasantness; reasons to disbelieve decreased it.

Conclusions:

• Emotions significantly impact beliefs about moral assertions, and vice versa.
• The findings support dual-process theories and offer insights into moral cognition and decision-making.
• This research highlights the distinct psychological mechanisms underlying moral versus factual judgments.