Schrödinger's fetus examined.

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Bioethics
• Metaphysics

Background:

• The concept of Schrödinger's Fetus by Joona Räsänen aims to reconcile conflicting intuitions about personhood.
• Elizabeth Harman's Actual Future Principle is a foundational element of Räsänen's proposal.
• Animalism, the view that human persons are human animals, is a shared philosophical commitment.

Purpose of the Study:

• To evaluate the philosophical underpinnings of Schrödinger's Fetus.
• To compare the efficacy of Elizabeth Harman's Actual Future Principle with other accounts of personhood.
• To analyze the implications of animalism for arguments concerning abortion and personhood.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis and argumentation.
• Conceptual critique of existing theories.
• Comparative evaluation of ethical principles.

Main Results:

• Elizabeth Harman's Actual Future Principle offers a more robust account of personhood than implicitly assumed by Schrödinger's Fetus.
• The adoption of animalism by both Räsänen and Harman inadvertently strengthens Don Marquis' 'future like ours' argument against abortion.
• The integration of animalism complicates the resolution of the initial contradictory intuitions.

Conclusions:

• While Harman's principle is philosophically stronger, the reliance on animalism presents a significant challenge.
• The 'future like ours' argument poses a persistent problem for theories of personhood that embrace animalism.
• Revisiting the foundational assumptions of personhood and potentiality is crucial for resolving debates on abortion ethics.