(How) Do You Regret Killing One to Save Five? Affective and Cognitive Regret Differ After Utilitarian and...

Area of Science:

• Moral Psychology
• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Decision-Making Science

Background:

• Sacrificial moral dilemmas involve choosing between harming one to save many, inevitably resulting in a death.
• Regret is a key emotional consequence, differentiated into affective (feelings) and cognitive (counterfactual thoughts) components.
• Dual-process models link affective processing to deontological judgments and cognitive deliberation to utilitarian judgments.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate the distinct roles of affective and cognitive regret in sacrificial moral decision-making.
• To test whether utilitarian judgments are associated with greater affective regret and less cognitive regret compared to deontological judgments.

Main Methods:

• Participants evaluated or imagined making decisions in sacrificial moral dilemmas.
• Responses were analyzed based on whether judgments were utilitarian (outcome-maximizing harm) or deontological (rejecting harm).
• Measures included self-reported affective regret and cognitive regret.

Main Results:

• Individuals making or imagining utilitarian judgments reported significantly more affective regret than those making deontological judgments.
• Utilitarian decision-makers sometimes reported less cognitive regret than deontological decision-makers.
• This indicates greater emotional distress but less inclination to reconsider the decision among those endorsing harm.

Conclusions:

• Affective and cognitive regret differentially map onto utilitarian and deontological moral judgments.
• Findings support dual-process models, suggesting affective responses are linked to utilitarian choices, while cognitive reflection may be less prominent.
• Understanding these regret components is crucial for comprehending moral decision-making under difficult circumstances.