Effect of vaccination strategies on the dynamic behavior of epidemic spreading and vaccine coverage

The transmission of infectious, yet vaccine-preventable, diseases is a typical complex social phenomenon, where the increasing level of vaccine update in the population helps to inhibit the epidemic spreading, which in turn, however, discourages more people to participate in vaccination campaigns, due to the "externality effect" raised by vaccination. We herein study the impact of vaccination strategies, pure, continuous (rather than adopt vaccination definitely, the individuals choose to taking vaccine with some probabilities), or continuous with randomly mutation, on the vaccination dynamics with a spatial susceptible-vaccinated-infected-recovered (SVIR) epidemiological model. By means of extensive Monte-Carlo simulations, we show that there is a crossover behavior of the final vaccine coverage between the pure-strategy case and the continuous-strategy case, and remarkably, both the final vaccination level and epidemic size in the continuous-strategy case are less than them in the pure-strategy case when vaccination is cheap. We explain this phenomenon by analyzing the organization process of the individuals in the continuous-strategy case in the equilibrium. Our results are robust to the SVIR dynamics defined on other spatial networks, like the Erdős-Rényi and Barabási-Albert networks.