Strategy equilibrium in dilemma games with off-diagonal payoff perturbations

We analyze the strategy equilibrium of dilemma games considering a payoff matrix affected by small and random perturbations on the off-diagonal. Notably, a recent work [Proc. R. Soc. A 476, 20200116 (2020)1364-502110.1098/rspa.2020.0116] reported that while cooperation is sustained by perturbations acting on the main diagonal, a less clear scenario emerges when perturbations act on the off-diagonal. Thus, the second case represents the core of this investigation, aimed at completing the description of the effects that payoff perturbations have on the dynamics of evolutionary games. Our results, achieved by analyzing the proposed model under a variety of configurations as different update rules, suggest that off-diagonal perturbations actually constitute a nontrivial form of noise. In particular, the most interesting effects are detected near the phase transition, as perturbations tend to move the strategy distribution towards nonordered states of equilibrium, supporting cooperation when defection is pervading the population, and supporting defection in the opposite case. To conclude, we identified a form of noise that, under controlled conditions, could be used to enhance cooperation and greatly delay its extinction.