Do metaphorical sharks bite? Simulation and abstraction in metaphor processing

In a metaphor such as lawyers are sharks, the concept lawyers, which is the metaphor topic, and the concept sharks, which is the metaphor vehicle, interact to produce a figurative meaning such that lawyers are predatory. Some theorists argue that sensorimotor properties of the vehicle are the basis of metaphor comprehension. Accordingly, the metaphor lawyers are sharks is processed as a simulation in which bodily actions related to sharks are accessed (e.g., sharks chasing prey). In contrast, the long-standing assumption is that metaphors are processed as abstractions with no role played by sensorimotor properties. From this theoretical perspective, abstract characteristics of sharks (e.g., vicious, predatory) are argued to be the core properties involved in metaphor processing. Here, we juxtapose these two opposing views of metaphor processing using cross-modal lexical priming. We find evidence that low-familiar metaphors (e.g., highways are snakes) prime bodily-action associates (i.e., slither) but not abstraction associates (i.e., danger), and are hence processed via simulation, whereas high-familiar metaphors (e.g., lawyers are sharks) prime abstraction associates (i.e., killer) but not bodily-action associates (i.e., bite) and are therefore processed via abstraction. The results align with views of cognition and language that posit the presence of both embodied and abstract representations.