Representation Wars: Enacting an Armistice Through Active Inference.

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Cognitive Science
• Neuroscience
• Computational Psychiatry

Background:

• The philosophy of cognitive science has long debated whether neurocognitive processes are representational or dynamic.
• Technological advancements have intensified this debate over the past 30 years.
• Active inference, an enactive generalization of predictive processing, has emerged as a unifying theory of brain function.

Purpose of the Study:

• To analyze the formal details of active inference.
• To determine if active inference can resolve the representationalist vs. dynamicist debate.
• To demonstrate the potential for representationalist and dynamicist perspectives to coexist within active inference.

Main Methods:

• Formal analysis of active inference principles.
• Examination of the theoretical underpinnings of representationalism and dynamism.
• Integration of these perspectives within the active inference framework.

Main Results:

• Active inference provides a formal basis for reconciling representationalist and dynamicist views.
• The theory accommodates both the representational content and dynamic processes of neurocognition.
• A potential resolution, or at least an armistice, to the long-standing debate is proposed.

Conclusions:

• Active inference offers a novel theoretical territory where representationalism and dynamism are not mutually exclusive.
• This unifying framework advances our understanding of brain function by integrating seemingly opposing philosophical stances.
• The findings suggest a path towards a more integrated philosophy of cognitive science.