Artificial Agents in Natural Moral Communities: A Brief Clarification

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence
• Ethics
• Moral Psychology

Background:

• The nature of moral responsibility is debated, questioning objective facts versus subjective, context-sensitive interactions.
• Emerging artificial intelligence (AI) and novel beings prompt a re-examination of agency and moral responsibility.
• Existing theories on moral responsibility offer insights into how we attribute it.

Purpose of the Study:

• To clarify the author's reliance on two competing views of responsibility in the context of AI.
• To explore how artificial agents can be integrated into existing frameworks of moral responsibility.
• To re-evaluate the criteria for moral responsibility in light of non-human agents.

Main Methods:

• Analysis of contemporary theories of moral responsibility.
• Comparison of human and artificial agency.
• Examination of the concept of the 'natural moral community'.

Main Results:

• Artificial intelligence and novel beings are not currently candidates for human-like moral responsibility.
• Contemporary moral theories demonstrate adaptability in extending responsibility concepts.
• Moral responsibility is primarily situated within the social ontology of the natural moral community.

Conclusions:

• Moral responsibility is adaptable and can be extended to include artificial agents within natural moral communities.
• Despite differences in kind, our moral attitudes and practices can evolve to encompass AI.
• The social nature of moral responsibility is paramount, even with the inclusion of artificial beings.