Analog hardware trojan design and detection in OFDM based wireless cryptographic ICs

Area of Science:

• Electrical Engineering
• Computer Engineering
• Cybersecurity

Background:

• Hardware Trojans (HTs) compromise the trustworthiness of Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chains, particularly in the semiconductor industry.
• Existing HT detection methods primarily focus on digital circuits, leaving Analog Mixed Signal (AMS)/RF circuits vulnerable.
• Analog/RF circuits, especially those in Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) based wireless cryptographic ICs, are increasingly targeted by attackers.

Purpose of the Study:

• To address the unexplored threat of Hardware Trojans in Analog Mixed Signal (AMS)/RF circuits within modern communication systems.
• To develop a Hardware Trojan (HT) threat model exploiting the extended cyclic prefix (ECP) property of OFDM to leak secret encryption keys.
• To create a detection mechanism for identifying such HTs in OFDM-based systems.

Main Methods:

• A trigger-based Hardware Trojan (HT) threat model was developed, leveraging the extended cyclic prefix (ECP) feature of OFDM.
• The threat model was designed to exploit the ECP to leak secret encryption keys over an Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel.
• A Cyclic Prefix (CP) checker-based detection mechanism, named "SENTRY", was engineered to identify triggered HTs.

Main Results:

• The proposed threat model successfully demonstrates the potential for Hardware Trojans (HTs) to leak secret encryption keys in OFDM systems.
• The SENTRY detection mechanism effectively identifies HTs once they are triggered by exploiting the Cyclic Prefix (CP) property.
• The detection mechanism operates effectively even under low noise Additive White Gaussian Channel (AWGN) conditions.

Conclusions:

• Hardware Trojans (HTs) represent a significant and growing threat to the security of wireless cryptographic ICs utilizing OFDM.
• The developed SENTRY system provides a viable solution for detecting Hardware Trojans (HTs) in OFDM-based communication systems.
• Proactive detection mechanisms are crucial for maintaining the integrity and security of the semiconductor supply chain against sophisticated Hardware Trojan (HT) attacks.