Protecting Physical Layer Secret Key Generation from Active Attacks.

Area of Science:

• Cybersecurity
• Wireless Communications
• Information Theory

Background:

• Lightweight session key agreement is crucial for Internet of Things (IoT) security in 6G networks.
• Physical layer secret key generation (SKG) using shared randomness is practical but vulnerable during the advantage distillation phase.
• Man-in-the-middle (MiM) and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks can compromise SKG schemes.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate the impact of injection and jamming attacks on SKG in multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) systems.
• To propose a defense mechanism against MiM attacks during the advantage distillation phase.
• To analyze optimal user strategies against reactive jammers using game theory.

Main Methods:

• Analysis of man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack feasibility in MIMO systems.
• Development and evaluation of a pilot randomization scheme to mitigate injection attacks.
• Application of game theory to model and solve the reactive jamming scenario.

Main Results:

• A MiM attack is feasible if the attacker possesses one more antenna than legitimate users.
• The proposed pilot randomization effectively reduces injection attacks to jamming attacks.
• Optimal strategies for legitimate users against reactive jammers were determined via game theory.

Conclusions:

• SKG schemes require robust defenses against active attacks during advantage distillation.
• Pilot randomization offers a practical countermeasure against MiM injection attacks in MIMO systems.
• Game-theoretic analysis provides insights into mitigating jamming threats in 6G wireless security.