No Moral Wiggle Room in an Experimental Corruption Game

Area of Science:

• Behavioral Economics
• Experimental Economics
• Public Policy

Background:

• Decision-makers often avoid information to maintain psychological comfort when engaging in selfish behavior.
• The phenomenon of "moral wiggle room" has not been previously studied in the context of corruption.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate whether public officials avoid information in a corruption context.
• To examine the role of "moral wiggle room" in public procurement decisions.

Main Methods:

• A framed public procurement experiment was conducted.
• Public officials were given the option to remain ignorant of the consequences of their decisions on citizen welfare.

Main Results:

• No significant evidence of information avoidance was found in the treatment group where officials could remain ignorant.
• This contrasts with previous findings on "moral wiggle room" in other contexts.

Conclusions:

• The absence of willful ignorance in this public procurement experiment suggests unique dynamics within corruption scenarios.
• Further research is needed to understand the specific factors influencing information avoidance in corrupt practices.