The evolution of deception

Area of Science:

• Evolutionary game theory
• Social sciences
• Information science

Background:

• Deception significantly impacts societal institutions and information dissemination.
• Existing research spans philosophy, psychology, economics, and political science, but lacks evolutionary insights.
• Understanding deception's emergence under competitive pressures is crucial.

Purpose of the Study:

• To analyze the growth of deception in societies by integrating evolutionary public goods games with interpersonal deception and truth-default theories.
• To explore the impact of deception on knowledge sharing over time.
• To identify effective strategies for reducing deception and its negative societal consequences.

Main Methods:

• Extensive simulation studies were conducted, modeling knowledge as a public good.
• The research integrated public goods games (PGGs) with interpersonal deception theory and truth-default theory.
• Simulations examined deception's effects on different knowledge-sharing societies and evaluated regulatory interventions.

Main Results:

• Deception negatively impacts the sharing and dissemination of knowledge within societies.
• Different types of knowledge-sharing societies exhibit varying vulnerabilities to deception.
• Cooperation in knowledge sharing can be restored through decentralized, case-by-case regulation of defection and deception.

Conclusions:

• Decentralized institutions that investigate and regulate both defection and deception are effective in re-establishing cooperation.
• Adopting methods to reduce deception is essential to prevent negative societal outcomes, such as a
• Tragedy of the Digital Commons.