Moral Judgement and Moral Progress: The Problem of Cognitive Control

Area of Science:

• Moral Philosophy
• Cognitive Science
• Psychology of Morality

Background:

• Theories of moral progress often assume individuals can exert significant cognitive control over their moral judgments.
• Such control is necessary to overcome epistemic biases and distorting factors influencing moral cognition.
• Existing frameworks may overestimate the capacity for self-correction in moral reasoning.

Purpose of the Study:

• To challenge the feasibility of moral progress based on cognitive control limitations.
• To argue that current theories of progress rely on unrealistic assumptions about human cognitive abilities.
• To highlight the underappreciated problem posed by overestimated self-control in moral judgment.

Main Methods:

• Presentation of conceptual arguments questioning the level of cognitive control over moral judgments.
• Inclusion of empirical evidence supporting the overestimation of control over moral cognition.
• Analysis of the implications of limited cognitive control for the prospects of moral progress.

Main Results:

• Demonstration that the assumed level of cognitive control for moral progress is likely unrealistic.
• Evidence suggests individuals overestimate their ability to control moral cognition and eliminate biases.
• The prospects for moral progress face significant, underappreciated challenges due to these cognitive limitations.

Conclusions:

• The feasibility of moral progress is fundamentally challenged by the limited cognitive control individuals possess.
• Revising theories of moral progress is necessary to account for realistic constraints on moral cognition.
• Further research should explore the practical implications of these findings for ethical development and societal change.